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REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT COVECREST PROPERTIES

I
THE SUBDIVIDERS ARE NOT SUBJECT TO A
NOTICE REQUIREMENT.
The City of West Jordan, Defendant-Respondent
herein, contends that § 63-13-11 and § 63-30-13, Utah Code
Ann., of Utah's Governmental Immunity Act (the "Act") are
applicable and dispositive of the issues on appeal.

Specifi-

cally, the City argues that the subdividers1 failure to file a
notice of claim and to plead compliance with the notice
requirements of the Act, renders their complaints fatally
defective.
However, in El Rancho Enterprises v. Murray City
Corp., 565 P.2d 778 (Utah 1977), the Utah Supreme Court held
that equitable claims and a claim for refund of monies paid to
a city under mistake or without authority of law, are exempt
from the notice requirements of the Act.

The Court said:

The common law exception to governmental
immunity pertaining to equitable claims
has long been recognized in this
jurisdiction.
Id. at 779.
In addition, the Court held that the enactment of
the Act has not eroded Utah's precedent; an equitable claim
may be brought without the necessity of first presenting a
claim for damages.

Id. 780; also see Jenkins v. Swan, 675

P.2d 1145,1154 (Utah 1983).
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Defendant cites Roosendahl Construction & Mining
Corporation v. Holman, 503 P.2d 446 (Utah 1972), as authority
for the proposition that where no notice of claim has been
filed, the plaintiff's complaint is fatally defective.
However, Roosendahl is distinguishable in that the case
involved a tax, rather than an impact fee collected and
retained without authority.

The plaintiff in Roosendahl made

a claim for damages against the Tax Commission, alleging that
the Commission acted maliciously and arbitrarily in its
actions and procedures.

The Court held that the acts

complained of fell within Section 63-30-10, of the Utah Code
Ann, and because no notice of claim had been filed defendants
were immune from suit.
If the Court decides that the notice requirement
should apply to the subdividers• claims, then it should
similarly determine that the notice requirement was satisfied.
The City received written notice of claim for, and on behalf
of, all subdividers similarly situated.
suit provided notice to the City.
have been superfluous.

In addition, the Call

Any additional notice would

The City has not been prejudiced.
II

WHEN DID THE SUBDIVIDERS1 CAUSE OF
ACTION ACCRUE?
The City argues that the subdividers1 cause of
action arose at the time they paid impact fees to the City for
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approval of subdivision development.

However, the City fails

to provide any legal precedent for such a proposition.

The

present lawsuit does not challenge the validity of the impact
fee ordinance.

If it did, perhaps a different statute of

limitations would be applicable.

In this case, the

subdividers seek refunds of monies paid under an ordinance
that was determined in 1986 to be invalid ab initio.

The

subdividers1 cause of action did not accrue before 1986.

Any

litigation before the Supreme Court's disposition of Call v.
West Jordan, 727 P.2d 180 (Utah 1986) would have required each
subdivider to sue the City, and challenge the validity of the
ordinance.

Such a result would have been contrary to judicial

economy, and may have produced different results.
Ill
WHICH STATUTE IS THE APPLICABLE STATUTE
OF LIMITATIONS?
The applicable statute of limitations to the
subdividers cause of action is Utah Code Ann., § 78-1225(1)(1989).

The Statute provides for a four-year period of

limitation in which to commence an action.
In Ponderosa One v. Salt Lake City Sub. San. D.,
738 P.2d 635 (Utah 1987) the Court held that the four-year
limitations period for work, labor or services rendered was
the appropriate limitation period in an action to recover
sewer service charges.

The plaintiffs in Ponderosa were
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engaged in the construction business and had filed suit for
recovery of a sewer connection fee charged by Salt Lake City
on an apartment complex under construction.

The case reached

the Utah Supreme Court in the context of an appeal from
summary judgment barring the plaintiff's action as untimely.
The City argues that the subdividers causes of
action are precluded by several other statutes of limitation.
Utah Code Ann., § 78-12-31, provides a six-month statute of
limitation for actions against officers for money paid to them
under protest.

The present lawsuit does not involve an action

against an officer of the City.
The City also claims that Utah Code Ann., § 78-1230, providing a one-year statute of limitations is applicable.
However, that statute is directly applicable to claims that
must be made in accordance with the Utah Governmental Immunity
Act.

The subdividers1 claims are exempt from the Act.
The City claims that Utah Code Ann., § 78-12-26(2),

is applicable, providing a three-year statute of limitation
for the taking of personal property.

However, if the Cityfs

collection of impact fees became illegal in 1986, when the
ordinance was determined to be void, then commencement of this
lawsuit in 1987 was well within the statutory period of
limitation.
Finally, the City argues that Utah Code Ann., § 7812-25, providing a four-year statute of limitation, precludes
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the subdividers1 action.

Again, if the cause of action arose

in 1986, when the ordinance was determined to be void, the
lawsuits were timely filed.

THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS SHOULD BE
TOLLED.
Should the Court determine that the subdividers1
cause of action arose prior to 1986, the running of the
statute of limitation should be tolled for the reasons set
forth in Appellantfs initial brief.
The City claims that the statute should not be
tolled, because there is no precedent in this jurisdiction for
application of the doctrine of equitable tolling.
The fact that Utah has not yet addressed the
principles and application of the doctrine, do not lessen the
compelling reasons for its consideration and application in
the present lawsuit.

The doctrine has been used to toll the

statute of limitations for plaintiffs, pending the outcome of
similar lawsuits.

Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, 321

U.S. 342, 64 S.Ct. 582, 88 L.Ed. 788 (1944); Collier v. City
of Pasadena, 191 Cal. Rptr. 681 (App. 1983); Donoghue v.
Orange County. 828 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir. 1987).
The City claims to have been prejudiced by the
filing of this lawsuit in 1987. However, the City does not
show any factual basis, or evidence of prejudice.
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They simply

claim the right to have the case tried within a reasonable
time of when the cause of action arose.
pc 27)

(Respondent's Brief,

They further argue that they have a right to have the

case tried before evidence is lost, memories have faded, and
witnesses are unavailable.

fid.)

However, the City fails to

provide any factual basis, or evidence that any evidence has
been lost, that any memories have faded, or that any witnesses
are unavailable.
Indeed, the City gathered all relevant evidence in
connection with its defense of the Call case.

R. 276-283.

The City was placed in a position to fairly defend this
action.

Its own evidence, gathered in connection with Call,

which was presented to the trial court, sets forth the amount
of impact fees paid by Covecrest Properties, and refers to
additional improvements that the City required be made by
Covecrest under Ordinance No. 33.

fid.)

It is the City's own evidence, confirmed by the
Affidavit of Gordon Walker, General Partner of Covecrest
Properties, that constitutes the totality of evidence.

There

is no other evidence that is relevant to a determination of
this matter, and there are no genuine issues of material fact.
As the Court said in El Rancho Enterprises v. Murray City
Corp., 565 P.2d 778 (Utah 1987):

"If the City obtained the

money of another by mistake, or without authority of law, it
is her duty to refund it

"

565 P.2d 778, 779.
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V
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE
SUBDIVIDERS1 MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT.
Finally, the City argues that there are numerous
factual issues that preclude summary judgment in favor of the
subdividers.

The City claims that the "factually-intensive"

defenses "ought to be obvious from the face of the pleadings."
(Respondent's Brief, p. 33). However, defendants are not
permitted to rely on their pleadings in opposition to a motion
for summary judgment.

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure

56(e) states:
When a motion for summary judgement is
made... an adverse party may not rest
upon the mere allegations or denials of
his pleading, but his response, by
affidavits or as otherwise provided in
this rule, must set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue
for trial.
Despite the City's claim, it failed to provide any
evidence that a genuine issue of material fact exists, on the
defenses of mistake, waiver, estoppel, or unjust enrichment.
The subdividers performed discovery of the City, and no
evidence was produced, giving rise to a genuine issue. Tr.
20, R. 267-268, R. 258-260.
CONCLUSION
The applicable statute of limitation is Utah Code
Ann., § 78-12-25, allowing a four-year period in which to
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commence an action.

The subdividers1 cause of action did not

accrue until 1986, when the Court determined the ordinance to
be void ab initio.
The notice requirement of Utah's Governmental
Immunity Act is inapplicable to the subdividers1 claims.

If

notice was required, the Court should find that it was
satisfied.
Should the Court determine that the period of
limitation began to run, prior to 1986, then justice and
equity demand a finding that the statute was tolled.

The City

made a timely investigation of all relevant facts in
connection with the Call case, and it has not been prejudiced
by the filing of the present lawsuits.

The subdividers1 right

to a refund of money that was collected and retained without
authority of law, should not be deemed forfeited.
As the City has provided no factual basis to any of
the equitable defenses that it has raised in the pleadings,
summary judgment in favor of the subdividers would be proper
and appropriate in this matter.
WHEREFORE, Covecrest Properties asks the Court to
reverse the trial court's Order, Ruling, and Judgment in this
matter, and to remand the case with instructions to enter
judgment in favor of the Plaintiff-Appellants for refund of
the impact fees they paid, with interest.

In addition,

Covecrest asks the Court to award costs to the Appellants, and
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for such other and further relief as deemed just in the
premises.
DATED this 26th day of September, 1990.
MARTIN & BIGELOW, P.C.

"MEL S. MARTIN
Attorneys for
Covecrest Properties
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